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1. Introduction
The paper presents a personal narrative about my exploration of algorithmic art machines.
Together with Stroud Cornock I presented a paper at a 1970 Computer Graphics conference, Computer
Graphics ’70 (CG70), held at Brunel University, UK. The title of the paper was “The Creative Process
where the Artist is Amplified or Superseded by the Computer”. In it, we discussed the advent of the
computer and the implications for art and for the role of the artist. Would this machine become the
artist of the future? Would the artist of the future have any role at all? The paper was later published
in Leonardo (Cornock and Edmonds 1973). Since we first wrote that paper nearly 50 years ago, time
has passed and in this article I will consider what has happened in that interval, thinking particularly
about how my own work has developed in this context. I will re-visit our thoughts from 1970 and
speculate on what comes next. What follows will consider algorithmic machines in the context of
making art. Algorithmic machines are at the centre of modern life in almost all of its aspects and art
does not stand apart from this. In this context, I again pose the question that Stroud Cornock and I
addressed in 1970: is the artist amplified or superseded by the computer?
2. Background
I first used a computer in my art practice when making my relief Nineteen, 1968–69, see Figure 1.
For this work, I wrote a program that helped me solve a problem that I had with determining the layout
of the 20 constituent pieces. More important, however, was the fact that this use of programming to
solve a problem alerted me to the potential significance of computer programming, of algorithms, to
art. I saw that algorithms could be used to generate art and also that the underlying order that such a
process implies was significant for the perception of art made in this way.
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Figure 1. Ernest Edmonds, Nineteen (1968–69). 
I became interested in algorithmic structures in two respects relevant to this article: first, the use 
of  them  is one way  in which  I make decisions  about  a work  and  reduce  the  specific  choices.  In 
making a work, the apparent freedom of the almost infinite range of possibilities is a difficulty. As, 
for example, Stravinsky claimed, true freedom comes with the application of constraints (Stravinsky 1942). 
After all, how is one to select from the infinite? This is, for example, the problem of facing the blank 
canvas  or  the  clean  sheet  of  paper.  It  is  necessary  to  find  a  way  of  reducing  the  options  to  a 
manageable level. One way of doing this is to select a structure to which the work will conform, such 
as an algorithm for determining the form. In fact, the choice or design of such an algorithm is a major 
aesthetic decision  in  itself. The  second  respect  in which  I  became  interested  is  that  constructive 
psychology, and the very existence of science, suggests that the search for order  is a fundamental 
attribute of human perception: the face seen in the stain on the wall. See for example (Fosnot 2005). It 
is  possible  or  even  probable  that  structures  in  artworks  are  very  significant  in  our  aesthetic 
experience of them. This may be so even if we do not know or notice the specifics. We often say that 
a work has a satisfying form, such as  in a  final movement  to a symphony, even when we cannot 
quite explain what caused our feeling of satisfaction. It is as if we respond to the architecture of a 
piece  of music  or  a  novel  before we  can  unravel  its  construction. We may  not  know  about  the 
algorithm that generated a work, but we might at least sense its existence, as exploited by the UK 
Systems artists (Bann 1972). 
I  first  explored  the  algorithm  in drawings  and paintings where  the process  of making was 
determined  in  advance—I  designed  an  algorithm  for  the  purpose—and  where  I  followed  the 
procedure by hand. For example, in the drawing shown in Figure 2, I decided in advance what lines 
should be drawn and in what order I should draw them. I then just acted rather like a computer in 
obeying those rules. There  is more to the drawing and  its structure, but this point will do for our 
purpose. Of course, I could have put those instructions into a computer program and had a plotter 
draw  the  image, which  is  fine.  In  this case, however,  I wanted  to experiment with  the process of 
following the algorithm myself. I was interested in the act of drawing and the micro decisions that I 
Figure 1. Ernest Edmonds, Nineteen (1968–69).
I became interested in algorithmic structures in two respects relevant to this article: first, the use
of them is one way in which I make decisions about a work and reduce the specific choices. In making
a work, the apparent freedom of the almost infinite range of possibilities is a difficulty. As, for example,
Stravinsky claimed, true freedom comes with the application of constraints (Stravinsky 1942). After all,
how is one to select from the infinite? This is, for example, the problem of facing the blank canvas or
the clean sheet of paper. It is necessary to find a way of reducing the options to a manageable level.
One way of doing this is to select a structure to which the work will conform, such as an algorithm for
determining the form. In fact, the choice or design of such an algorithm is a major aesthetic decision in
itself. The second respect in which I became interested is that constructive psychology, and the very
existence of science, suggests that the search for order is a fundamental attribute of human perception:
the face seen in the stain on the wall. See for example (Fosnot 2005). It is possible or even probable
that structures in artworks are very significant in our aesthetic experience of them. This may be so
even if we do not know or notice the specifics. We often say that a work has a satisfying form, such
as in a final movement to a symphony, even when we cannot quite explain what caused our feeling
of satisfaction. It is as if we respond to the architecture of a piece of music or a novel before we can
unravel its construction. We may not know about the algorithm that generated a work, but we might
at least sense its existence, as exploited by the UK Systems artists (Bann 1972).
I first explored the algorithm in drawings and paintings where the process of making was
determined in advance—I designed an algorithm for the purpose—and where I followed the procedure
by hand. For example, in the drawing shown in Figure 2, I decided in advance what lines should be
drawn and in what order I should draw them. I then just acted rather like a computer in obeying
those rules. There is more to the drawing and its structure, but this point will do for our purpose.
Of course, I could have put those instructions into a computer program and had a plotter draw the
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image, which is fine. In this case, however, I wanted to experiment with the process of following the
algorithm myself. I was interested in the act of drawing and the micro decisions that I made as I put
pen to paper, as well as in the order that the algorithm gave. This approach was not possible in the
next development: time-based art.
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Figure 2. Ernest Edmonds, Drawing: 7 (1975). 
Algorithmic  art  is produced with  the  aid of  a  computer by programming  it  to  follow  some 
procedure  that generates  the art object. Much of  the early work of  this kind produced drawings 
executed  on  a  graph  plotter  or was  drawn  by  a  human  as  in  the  case described  above.  Today, 
however, such processes are often associated with time‐based art in which the generation of images 
is seen as a ‘projection’ over time by the audience or viewer (Le Grice 1977). 
Between 1980 and 1985,  I developed a  system  for making  time based abstract artworks  that 
were generated by computer  in real  time  (i.e.,  in  the  time employed  for projection) and recorded 
directly  onto  videotape. The  first  completed  piece was  Fragment which  lasted  an  hour  and was 
shown as part of an art  exhibition  in London  in 1985  (Edmonds 1985). See Figures 3 and 4. The 
images consisted of various arrangements of black and white squares as well as pure black and pure 
white frames. The key point about this work was the full incorporation of the time element into the 
generative process implemented within the computer. Time was a concrete part of the constructed 
work. In Fragment, and other work done at that time, both the images and the timing are determined 
by the generative rules as the computer system works through them. The totality of the work, with 
Algorith ic art is produced with the aid of a co puter by progra ing it to follow so e
procedure that generates the art object. uch of the early work of this kind produced drawings
executed on a graph plotter or was drawn by a human as in the case described above. Today, however,
such processes are often associated with time-based art in which the generation of images is seen as a
‘projection’ over time by the audience or viewer (Le Grice 1977).
Between 1980 and 1985, I developed a system for making time based abstract artworks that were
generated by computer in real time (i.e., in the time employed for projection) and recorded directly
onto videotape. The first completed piece was Fragment which lasted an hour and was shown as part
of an art exhibition in London in 1985 (Edmonds 1985). See Figures 3 and 4. The images consisted
of various arrangements of black and white squares as well as pure black and pure white frames.
The key point about this work was the full incorporation of the time element into the generative process
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implemented within the computer. Time was a concrete part of the constructed work. In Fragment,
and other work done at that time, both the images and the timing are determined by the generative
rules as the computer system works through them. The totality of the work, with the exception of its
physical manifestation, is therefore completely implicit in the defining rules. For a discussion of the
construction of these works see (Edmonds 1988).
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Figure 3. Ernest Edmonds, still from Fragment (1964–65). 
 
Figure 4. Ernest Edmonds, still from Fragment (1964–65). 
The algorithmic system that generates a work such as Fragment is, of course, a closed system. 
That is to say, the system is entirely self‐contained and has no exchange with any other system, that 
is,  it  has  no  exchange  with  the  outside  world.  Many  artists  add  calls  to  random  number 
generators—technically pseudo random numbers (Strawderman 1965)—into their algorithms so that 
the  resulting  works  are  unpredictable  and/or  are  different  each  time  the  algorithm  is  run.  The 
motives vary, but include the idea of simulating ‘creative’ interventions and simulating interchange 
with a world outside the algorithm (Baggi 2008). I use another approach. After making the series of 
works starting with Fragment, I began to make works where the algorithmic system was open, where 
the  system had  exchanges with  its  environment  taking  readings  from  sensors,  for  example,  and 
progressing in different ways depending on the values of those readings. In plain language, I was 
making interactive systems: something discussed in some detail in the 1970 paper mentioned at the 
beginning of this article, and which has been central to much of my recent work (Edmonds 2003). 
We can think of the algorithms used for open systems as having a meta‐logic that draws upon 
the exchanges with the outside world—for example reacting to the detection of movement. The meta‐logic 
Figure 3. Ernest Edmonds, still from Fragment (1964–65).
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The algorithmic system that generates a work such as Fragment is, of course, a closed system. 
That is to say, the system is entirely self‐contained and has no exchange with any other system, that 
is,  it  has  no  exchange  with  the  outside  world.  Many  artists  add  calls  to  random  number 
generators—technically pseudo random numbers (Strawderman 1965)—into their algorithms so that 
the  resulting  works  are  unpredictable  and/or  are  different  each  time  the  algorithm  is  run.  The 
motives vary, but include the idea of simulating ‘creative’ interventions and simulating interchange 
with a world outside the algorithm (Baggi 2008). I use another approach. After making the series of 
works starting with Fragment, I began to make works where the algorithmic system was open, where 
the  system had  exchanges with  its  environment  taking  readings  from  sensors,  for  example,  and 
progressing in different ways depending on the values of those readings. In plain language, I was 
making interactive systems: something discussed in some detail in the 1970 paper mentioned at the 
beginning of this article, and which has been central to much of my recent work (Edmonds 2003). 
We can think of the algorithms used for open systems as having a meta‐logic that draws upon 
the exchanges with the outside world—for example reacting to the detection of movement. The meta‐logic 
i . t , till f t ( ).
The algorithmic system that generates a work such as Fragment is, of course, a closed system.
That is to say, the system is entirely self-contained and has no exchange with any other system,
that is, it has no exchange with the outside world. Many artists add calls to random number
generators—technically pseudo random numbers (Strawderman 1965)—into their algorithms so that
the resulting works are unpredictable and/or are different each time the algorithm is run. The motives
vary, but include the idea of simulating ‘creative’ interventions and simulating interchange with
a world outside the algorithm (Baggie 2008). I use another approach. After making the series of
works starting with Fragment, I began to make works where the algorithmic system was open, where
the system had exchanges with its environment taking readings from sensors, for example, and
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progressing in different ways depending on the values of those readings. In plain language, I was
making interactive systems: something discussed in some detail in the 1970 paper mentioned at the
beginning of this article, and which has been central to much of my recent work (Edmonds 2003).
We can think of the algorithms used for open systems as having a meta-logic that draws upon the
exchanges with the outside world—for example reacting to the detection of movement. The meta-logic
can automatically change the algorithms used to generate the artwork. The obvious case is where
the algorithm is prompted to respond directly to a stimulus. However, that need not be the case.
The meta-rules can change the algorithm so that its potential behaviour in the future is modified,
without there necessarily being any immediate reaction to the stimulus. A person can learn without
performing any observable action. A teacher might face still and blank looking students, but they
might in fact be learning. I call this kind of interaction ‘influence’ (Edmonds 2007).
A book by Francesco Franco describing a fuller picture of my artistic journey has recently been
published (Franco 2018).
3. Algorithmic Machines and Art
In the modern world the algorithm, in its various forms, is central to so much of life. From the
washing machine to the car and airplane, from selecting a holiday to trading shares, from finding a
book to finding a friend, algorithms control or influence the process. In the 19th century, a machine was
a mechanical thing; but in the 21st century, the essence of most machines is to be found in an algorithm.
In many cases, the algorithms used in machines are relatively clear sets of procedural instructions
or declarative rules: “do this, then that and on some condition do something else” or “always meet
this condition and don’t allow this state to arise”. However, more and more we seem to be confronted
with artificial intelligent (AI) machines. Exactly what an artificially intelligent machine is may not be
all that clear, but one thing that is certain is that the details of how such machines work is obscure
to most people. Briefly, there are two main classes of such machines, those using symbolic AI and
those using connectionist AI. The algorithms that drive a symbolic AI system can be seen as explicit
sets of rules, formal statements, about the subject of concern with an engine of some kind that can
act on those rules, making decisions as appropriate. The algorithms that drive a connectionist AI
system, on the other hand, are essentially statistically based and are developed from a learning process.
Typically, large sets of examples are used to enable the system to automatically develop the ability
to make correct, or appropriate decisions. For example, face recognition systems are typically of this
kind. There are plusses and minuses for both kinds of AI. Connectionist AI systems have proved very
successful in many recent applications. They are, however, obscure in the sense that they do not easily
reveal the reasoning behind any given decision. It is somewhat easier to draw such explanations out
of a symbolic AI system.
Procedural, declarative, and AI algorithms, of whatever sort, may have different implications
for art. For example, a declarative algorithm could well match a set of specific composition rules that
an artist wants his work to conform to. The algorithm might then embody explicit qualities that are
desired. On the other hand, a connectionist algorithm might be used to recognise a face and so enable
the artist to arrange that the work responds in a particular way when someone is looking at it.
4. Amplified or Superseded?
As mentioned above, in the 1970 paper, Stroud Cornock and I considered the issue of whether
the computer, our algorithmic machine, might amplify or just supersede the artist. Without repeating
the full argument, our basic thinking then was that “Though the computer can replace man in the
production of graphic images, its function in the arts is seen as assisting in the specification of art
systems and in their subsequent real-time management.” In particular, we said that “The traditional
role of an artist is clearly called into question by these developments . . . so that when one speaks of an
‘artist’ one means he who is performing a kind of catalysis of creative behaviour within society and not
a specialist working for a section of that society. His major function might, therefore, be to initiate.”
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The thinking behind these remarks was driven by the whole idea of computing. We considered
the issue of where the humans, the artists, might find themselves. The answer, as we then saw it, was
that the artist would become the figure who, as it were, set things up. So, whilst in some sense the
computer might be left to create the artwork in detail, the artist would have defined the framework
within which the situation was defined. Looking back on that position, it seems hard to take a different
view. So, for the moment, I confirm that early position.
Another issue, not discussed in the 1970 paper, is the role of algorithms in the art making process.
It turned out that after my making of Nineteen this was crucially important in my own development.
As I have described above, but now re-conceptualised, the important issue of using an algorithm as
an art making process was a critical advance. This idea was widespread as we know well but the
particular significance in our context is the degree that it ties the invention of computation, of the
general purpose computer, to a way of making art.
The underlying structures of the artwork can now be seen in computational terms. The algorithms
create the work whilst, of course, the artist creates the algorithms (GV Art 2014).
5. Conclusions: The Significance of the Algorithmic Machines in Art
The thoughts that are recorded in this article were brought to a particular significance with the
Algorithmic Signs exhibition in Venice (Franco 2017). In this show, I exhibited along with Manfred
Mohr, Vera Molnar, Roman Verotsko, and Frieder Nake. All of us used algorithms to make our art
and many of us had done that for 50 years or so. What was the incisive point about the show? For me
it came from a conversation with someone who was not deeply into visual art but had been deeply
into computing for very many years (Catton 2017). The point that we jointly discovered was that
this exhibition of algorithmic art represented art that engaged with the key issues that are part of
modern life. Very many aspects of life are conducted by—or influenced by—algorithms, from selecting
a holiday to obtaining a loan. In the developed world, at least, we could argue that our lives are partly
driven by algorithms and yet they remain an unexplored territory for many people. So this kind of art
is engaged with contemporary life like no other. The old Cornock/Edmonds issue of “amplified or
superseded” has not changed—the computer, the algorithm, the machine—is still something that the
artist uses to create a framework of some kind. However, the metaphor of the algorithm, as used in art,
is surely a metaphor of life itself, as we know it today. So I argue that this work is in no way on the
edge of contemporary art, but is at the very core of our contemporary concerns.
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